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WHO IS IN CHARGE, AND WHO SHOULD BE? 
THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE 
COMMANDER IN MILITARY JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS 
LINDSY NICOLE ALLEMAN* 
“Discipline is the soul of an army.  It makes small numbers formi-
dable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all . . . .” 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Take a drive down the highway or a look into any parking lot 
and you will notice a plethora of yellow magnetic “Support Our 
Troops” ribbons decorating the backs of many cars.  It is impossible 
to escape the fact that the American public has great support for, and 
interest in, the military.  September 11th, the war in Iraq, and the af-
termath of Hurricane Katrina keep the military as a perpetual topic in 
the news and in the minds of Americans.  One aspect of the military 
seems to be particularly intriguing to Americans—military justice.  
The number of news stories focusing on issues of military justice—
ranging from the investigation of the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu 
Ghraib, to the legal challenges made on behalf of the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees, and the court-martial of Sgt. Hasan Akbar at Fort 
Bragg—serve to illustrate the popularity and intrigue of the issue.  
Fictionalization of military justice in TV shows such as E-Ring and 
JAG or in movies like A Few Good Men also attracts broad audiences 
and, in doing so, provides the public with insight into the military jus-
tice process in action.  While neither the news stories nor the dra-
matic cinematic portrayals of the military justice system may be com-
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 1. General George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains (July 29, 1757) in 4 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, Nov. 1756—Oct. 1757 341, 344 (W.W. Abbot 
& Dorothy Twohig eds., 1984). 
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pletely accurate, they do keep the topic in the forefront of the Ameri-
can public’s interest. 
Not only is the American public paying attention to issues of 
military justice, but, in light of the 50th anniversary of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 2001 and reforms taking place in 
other countries, an academic debate over the military justice system 
in the United States has evolved, triggering calls for reform from one 
side and fierce voicing of support from the other.2  In particular, the 
debate has focused on the role of the commander in the military jus-
tice system.  This Note will explore the dominant role of the U.S. mili-
tary commander within the military justice system in comparison to 
the far smaller role of the Canadian military commander and the al-
most nonexistent role of the Israeli military commander.  Canada and 
Israel were chosen for this comparative analysis because of their 
unique stances regarding the role of their commanders in military jus-
tice and because both countries were noted in the Cox Commission 
Report3 for their reform efforts. 
I.  THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
COMMANDER IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States military justice system, the commander 
plays a dominant role.  The commander, often called “the convening 
authority” in light of his ability to convene court-martial proceedings, 
is given great latitude in dealing with disciplinary matters.4  “A mili-
tary convening authority is singularly powerful with respect to his in-
fluence over the military justice system.  He has no civilian equiva-
lent.  He is not a lawyer and generally has no formal legal training.”5  
His authority and discretion to make disciplinary decisions regarding 
the soldiers serving beneath him, however, stem from the convening 
authority’s leadership position.6  The convening authority is a senior 
 
 2. See James F. Garrett, Recent Developments in Unlawful Command Influence, 2004 
ARMY LAW. 2, 6 (2004) (outlining the debate over public perception of the military justice sys-
tem). 
 3. See infra notes 26-46. 
 4. James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New 
Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185, 192 (2002). 
 5. Meredith L. Robinson, Volunteers for the Death Penalty? The Application of Solorio v. 
United States to Military Capital Litigation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1998). 
 6. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, MILITARY JUSTICE AT THE SUMMARY 
TRIAL LEVEL 1-13 (2001), available at 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/training/publications/POCT_docs/military_justice_manual_e.pdf 
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commanding officer, often a colonel or general.7  The commander has 
the power to do the following: conduct direct investigations,8 author-
ize probable cause searches,9 refer charges to court-martial,10 convene 
courts-martial,11 grant witnesses immunity,12 negotiate and approve 
pretrial agreements,13 make capital referrals to courts-martial,14 select 
courts-martial panel members,15 grant funding to government and de-
fense counsel for employment of expert witnesses,16 approve sen-
tences,17 and grant clemency.18  The U.S. commander plays a domi-
nant role in all aspects of the disciplinary system and “has near 
absolute discretion at every stage of a military justice proceeding.”19 
By establishing such a dominant role for the convening authority, 
the military justice system presents the potential problem of a com-
mander using his power and influence in such a way as to thwart the 
fairness, impartiality, and integrity of disciplinary proceedings.  Such 
negative use of power has been termed “unlawful command influ-
ence.”20  The general concern regarding unlawful command influence 
is that the commander has the ability to influence judicial proceedings 
and participants in such a way as to deprive the accused of his right to 
a fair trial.21  As stated bluntly by Chief Judge of the Court of Military 
Appeals (now renamed U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces), Robinson O. Everett, “[c]ommand influence is the mortal 
 
(Can.) (“The ability to command respect and to effectively control subordinates is based to a 
large part on the leadership ability of the officer.”).  
 7. Roan, supra note 4, at 196. 
 8. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 303 (2005) [hereinafter 
MCM]. 
 9. Id., Mil. R. Evid. 315(d). 
 10. Id. R.C.M. 407(a).  
 11. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 22-24 (2005) [hereinafter UCMJ]. 
 12. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 704(c). 
 13. Id. R.C.M. 705. 
 14. Id. R.C.M. 601. 
 15. Id. R.C.M. 502(a)(1). 
 16. Id. R.C.M. 703(d). 
 17. Id. R.C.M. 1107.  The commander does not, however, have the power to change a find-
ing of not guilty or to increase a sentence.  Id. 
 18. Id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1). 
 19. Robinson, supra note 5, at 1061. 
 20. Unlawful command influence has been defined as “the improper interference by a su-
perior in command with the independent judgment of a person responsible for judicial deci-
sion.” CHARLES A. SHANOR & L. LYNN HOGUE, MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 117 (1996).  
 21. Jack L. Rives & Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus Military Justice in the United 
States: A Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L. REV. 213, 226 (2002). 
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enemy of military justice.”22  For this reason, even the perception of 
unlawful command influence is considered problematic.23  Thus, the 
UCMJ endeavors to remove actual instances of unlawful command 
influence and minimize any appearance of it by forbidding command-
ers from attempting to influence judicial proceedings.24  Under Arti-
cle 98, disciplinary action can be taken against those who obstruct 
courts-martial proceedings.25  Nonetheless, the central role of the 
commander makes the potential for unlawful command influence a 
constant concern. 
In 2001, in recognition of the 50th anniversary of the UCMJ, the 
National Institute of Military Justice, a private, non-profit organiza-
tion focusing on fairness in the military, sponsored a commission to 
review the military justice system.26  Named for its chair, the Honor-
able Walter T. Cox III, a former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Cox Commission solicited com-
ments and held a public hearing in order to develop recommenda-
tions for improvements to the UCMJ.27  The commission members 
also took this as a chance to learn from the experiences of other coun-
tries in the administration of military justice.  The Cox Commission 
specifically noted that “[i]n recent years, countries around the world 
have modernized their military justice systems, moving well beyond 
the framework created by the UCMJ fifty years ago.  In contrast, mili-
tary justice in the United States has stagnated, remaining insulated 
from external review and largely unchanged despite dramatic shifts in 
armed forces demographics, military missions, and disciplinary strate-
gies.”28  The Cox Commission noted the influence of reform efforts in 
 
 22. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). 
 23. See James Kevin Lov ejoy, Watchdog or Pitbull?: Recent Developments in Judicial Re-
view of Unlawful Command Influence, 1999 ARMY LAW 25, 27 (1999).  
 24. UCMJ art. 37 (2005).  See also MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 104(a)(1) (“No convening 
authority or commander may censure, reprimand, or admonish a court-martial or other military 
tribunal or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sen-
tence adjudged by the court -martial or tribunal, or with respect to any other exercise of the 
functions or the court-martial or tribunal or such persons in the conduct of the proceedings.”). 
 25. UCMJ, art. 98 (2005). 
 26. The Honorable Walter T. Cox, III, Chair, Report of the Commission on the 50th Anni-
versary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice , 2001 NAT’L INST. OF MIL. JUST. 1. [hereinafter 
“Cox Commission Report”]. 
 27. Id. at 3-4 (“More than 250 individuals, representing themselves and more than a dozen 
organizations, submitted written comments to the Commission.  Nineteen testified in person.  
This Report, [is] intended for submission to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Ser-
vices, the Secretary of Defense, the Service Se cretaries, and the Code Committee . . . .”). 
 28. Id. at 3 (citations omitted). 
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several foreign jurisdictions, including Canada and Israel.29  After its 
review of concerns and potential solutions, the commission produced 
what is commonly referred to as the Cox Commission Report and 
made four recommendations regarding the practice and procedures of 
courts-martial.30  Two of those recommendations relate specifically to 
the dominant role of the U.S. military commander: 
1. Modify the pretrial role of the convening authority in both select-
ing court-martial members and making other pre-trial legal deci-
sions that best rest within the purview of a sitting military judge. 
2. Increase the independence, availability, and responsibility of 
military judges.31 
The Commission noted that command involvement is essentia l to the 
disciplinary system in the military, but should not go so far as to 
weaken the due process rights of service members.32 
In the opinion of the Cox Commission, convening authorities 
cast undeniable shadows of unfairness over courts-martial due to the 
commanders’ ability to control the possible outcomes of trials.33  The 
Cox Commission noted that “[t]he combined power of the convening 
authority to determine which charges shall be preferred, the level of 
court-martial, and the venue where the charges will be tried, coupled 
with the idea that this same convening authority selects the members 
of the court-martial to try the cases, is unacceptable in a society that 
deems due process of law to be the bulwark of a fair justice system.”34  
The dominant role of commanding officers was considered the most 
problematic issue in the military justice system because it permits ac-
tual unlawful command influence as well as the appearance of such.35 
The Cox Commission Report stresses that, in order to remedy 
this problem, the most immediate change necessary is to remove the 
selection of panel members from the control of convening authori-
ties.36  By requiring the convening authority to select panel members 
and charging that same authority with the investigation and prosecu-
 
 29. Id. at 3 n.4 (noting reforms in the U.K. Australia, India, Ireland, Mexico, and South 
Africa, in addition to those in Canada and Israel). 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 8. 
 35. See id. at 6-7 (“The far-reaching role of commanding officers in the court -martial proc-
ess remains the greatest barrier to operating a fair system of criminal justice within the armed 
forces.”). 
 36. Id. at 7. 
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tion of the defendant, the present system unnecessarily risks the ap-
pearance of improper command influence.37  To address this problem, 
the Cox Commission recommended that Article 25 of the UCMJ be 
amended to require the convening authority to prepare a list of eligi-
ble service members and then randomly select individuals from that 
list in order to build the slate of panel members.38 
The Cox Commission also notes its concern over the convening 
authorities’ vast power over pretrial decisions, stating that “the per-
ception that the convening authority can manipulate the pretrial 
process to the advantage of either side . . . mandates [a] change in au-
thority [of commanders] over pretrial legal matters.”39  Pretrial deci-
sions, from approving travel of witnesses to the control over the in-
vestigation of crimes,40 necessarily involve issues of due process and 
equal protection.  The Cox Commission further hones in on the point 
that, while the ability to make pretrial decisions can actually affect the 
outcome of the trial, even the mere appearance of a convening au-
thority manipulating the process is sufficient to warrant a change.41  
Since pretrial decisions involve legal questions, the Cox Commission 
noted that these decisions are more appropriately made by a military 
judge.42  Furthermore, in reference to judges, the Cox Commission 
Report advocated not only that their roles in the pretrial decisions be 
strengthened, but also that they be granted increased judicial inde-
pendence from the convening authority.43  The Cox Commission ad-
vised that in order to decrease the perception of the commander ex-
ercising unlawful command influence over judges, standing judicial 
circuits should be created and judges should be given tenure.44 
In summary, the Cox Commission’s main recommendations with 
regard to fairness and the perception of fairness in the United States 
military justice system include limiting the dominant role of the com-
mander in selecting panel members and making pretrial decisions, as 
well as increasing the independence of judges.  As the Cox Commis-
sion noted, other countries have instituted reforms to deal with the 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 7. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text (discussing the powers of the convening 
authority in the disciplinary process). 
 41. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 8. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 8-9. 
 44. Id. 
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problem of command influence in their military justice systems.45  The 
approaches taken by Canada and Israel are particularly illustrative of 
the different methods by which a country can attempt to guarantee 
fairness within the military justice system. 
II.  THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
COMMANDER IN CANADA 
The military justice system used by the Canadian Forces was 
once very similar to that of the United States, since both systems were 
originally based on the English form of military justice under the Brit-
ish Articles of War.46  Canada, however, has subsequently moved be-
yond the United States by greatly reducing the role of commanders in 
its military disciplinary system.47  The statutory basis for the Canadian 
military justice system is the Code of Service Discipline, embodied in 
the National Defense Act, Part III.48  Further provisions can also be 
found in the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian 
Forces, enacted by the Canadian Cabinet and Minister of National 
Defense.49  Major changes to the Canadian military justice system 
have taken place in the last 25 years as a result of legal changes, court 
challenges, and public opinion. 
In 1982, Canada significantly changed its domestic law by adopt-
ing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.50  The Charter es-
tablished the rights that every Canadian citizen has, even those in the 
military, unless exceptions can be justified.51 Some rights guaranteed 
by the Charter, however, may be more limited in the context of mili-
tary service: for example, the Charter specifies that offenses under 
military law are to be tried by military tribunal.52  The adoption of the 
 
 45. Id. at 3 n.4.  See also supra note 29. 
 46. Christopher W. Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape: In Defense of Convening Au-
thority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REV. 190, 193, 
266 (2003). 
 47. See id. at 193-94. 
 48. Jerry S.T. Pitzul & John C. Maguire, A Perspective on Canada’s Code of Service Disci-
pline, 52 A.F. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 (being sched. B to 
the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)). 
 51. Telephone Interview with Ken Watkin, Deputy Judge Advocate General for the Cana-
dian International Forces in Durham, North Carolina (Apr. 19, 2005).  
 52. MILITARY JUSTICE AT THE SUMMARY TRIAL LEVEL, supra note 6, at 1-3, 1-4, 1-6.  Ar-
ticle 11(d) of the Charter guarantees that a person charged with an offense has the right “to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal.”  Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art. 11(d). 
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Charter forced the Canadian Forces to “reconcile its military justice 
provisions and processes with the constitutional protections embod-
ied in the Charter.”53  Incremental changes in the military justice sys-
tem resulted from this de facto merger between certain aspects of the 
military and civilian criminal legal processes.54 
Encouraged by the adoption of the Charter, legal challenges to 
the independence of the military court arose.  The most significant of 
these cases is R. v. Généreux, argued before the Canadian Supreme 
Court in 1992.55  In Généreux, a corporal appealed his general court-
martial conviction for drug trafficking and desertion, arguing that the 
court-martial did not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal 
under the Charter’s Article 11(d).56  The Court held that military 
commanders should not be able to interfere in matters directly and 
immediately relevant to the judicial process.57  The court analyzed the 
differences between true independence and perceived independence, 
concluding that actual lack of judicial independence did not need to 
be established for a successful challenge.58  Moreover, the Court 
noted that “irrespective of any actual bias on the part of the tribunal, 
[the law] seeks to maintain the integrity of the judicial system by pre-
venting any reasonable apprehensions of such bias.”59  The Court 
used an objective standard, asking whether an informed, reasonable 
person would perceive the military court as being independent.60  In 
the Court’s opinion, the dominant role of the commander cast serious 
doubts on the institutional independence of military justice proceed-
ings.61  In particular, judges in the court-martial system lacked the 
safety of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.62  
Regarding tenure, the Court noted that judges should only be remov-
able for cause.  The Court also voiced concern that making the com-
manding officer responsible for a judge’s fitness reports was inappro-
priate because doing so gave the commanding officer the power to 
jeopardize a judge’s career by issuing negative reports.63  The Cana-
 
 53. Pitzul, supra note 48, at 8. 
 54. Watkin Interview, supra note 51. 
 55. R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259.  
 56. Id. at 260. 
 57. Id. at 308-10. 
 58. Id. at 286. 
 59. Id. at 283. 
 60. Id. at 286 -87 
 61. R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 308-09. 
 62. Id. at 302-03, 307-10. 
 63. Id. at 305. 
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dian Supreme Court held that military tribunals were not independ-
ent and impartial and thus violated the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.64 
Following the decision in Généreux, public interest and inquiry 
into the Canadian military justice system was further heightened in 
1993 after Canadian Forces committed human rights violations while 
involved in peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia.65  There 
was great public outcry against how the punishment of the offenders 
was handled, resulting in the creation of a governmental Commission 
of Inquiry to investigate allegations that the commanders’ involve-
ment in the military justice system was inappropriate.66  The Commis-
sion took a broad approach and examined both civilian and military 
expectations of the military justice system.67 
As a result of the adoption of the Charter, court challenges, and 
the increase in public scrutiny due to the incidents in Somalia and 
Bosnia, Canada implemented a number of legislative changes to ad-
just the Canadian Forces’ military justice system.68  Important 
changes, which increased courts-martial independence include: 
· “[S]eparating the functions of convening courts-
martial and appointing judges and panel members; 
· [A]dopting a random methodology for selecting 
courts-martial panel members; and 
· [I]mplementing reforms to ensure the protection of 
tenure, financial security and institutional inde-
pendence of military judges, including appointing 
judges for fixed terms, adopting the civilian ‘cause-
based’ removal standard and discontinuing the use 
of career evaluations as a measure of judicial per-
formance.”69 
Furthermore, the prosecutorial function was removed from the com-
mander’s control and assigned to the Director of Military Prosecu-
tions, and the appointment of panel members was centralized under 
the Chief Military Trial Judge.70  These changes have minimized the 
role of the Canadian commander in the military justice system so that 
 
 64. Id. at 314. 
 65. Pitzul, supra note 48, at 11. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Watkin Interview, supra note 51. 
 68. Behan, supra note 46, at 267. 
 69. Pitzul, supra note 48, at 8. 
 70. Behan, supra note 46, at 267-68. 
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he now exerts less influence in military justice proceedings than his 
U.S. counterpart. 
III.  THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
COMMANDER IN ISRAEL 
Israel has taken a more extreme approach than Canada to limit 
the risk of undue command influence in their military justice system.  
The Israel Defense Forces are governed by the Military Justice Law 
(MJL) enacted in 1955.71  Under the MJL, legal powers “are granted 
to the Military Advocate General, which is a professional body made 
up of lawyers who operate independently and free from external in-
fluences.”72  The Military Advocate General (MAG) is responsible 
for several key functions of the military justice system, including the 
filing of the charge sheet,73 arraignment,74 ordering a preliminary in-
vestigation by an investigating judge,75 and supervision of disciplinary 
proceedings before a commander.76  In addition, the MAG can over-
turn or adjust an unlawful sentence imposed by a commander.77  This 
last power, the ability to interfere in the judicial activity of a com-
manding officer who may outrank the MAG, is unique to the Israeli 
military justice system78 and ensures that sentences are reviewed by a 
legally trained member of the military.79 
Although the MAG has broad military justice powers in the Is-
rael Defense Forces, commanders also retain some limited control.  
The Israeli equivalent of the American convening authority is the 
District Chief.80  The District Chief can order the Chief Military 
 
 71. Military Justice Law, 5715-1955, 9 LSI 195, (1954-55) (Isr.). 
 72. Menachem Finkelstein & Yifat Tomer, The Israeli Military Legal System—Overview of 
the Current Situation and a Glimpse into the Future, 52 A.F. L. REV. 137, 144 (2002). 
 73. Military Justice Law §§ 280-82. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. § 178(4). 
 76. Id. §§ 136-76. 
 77. Id. § 168(4). 
 78. Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 144. 
 79. Telephone Interview with Lt. Col. Amos N. Guiora, former Military Advocate General 
with the Israel Defense Forces and current Professor of Law at Case School of Law in Durham, 
North Carolina (Apr. 18, 2005).  “[T]he MAG is gene rally subordinate to military orders but at 
the same time has a separate, independent obligation to fulfill the roles prescribed by law.”  
Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 140 n.12.  Furthermore, in a MAG’s chain of command, 
his superior is not the District Chief, but is also a MAG who is at least a two star general.  
Guiora Interview, supra . 
 80. Guiora Interview, supra note 79. 
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Prosecutor to file an appeal,81 he can order, with consent of the MAG, 
the quashing of a charge sheet,82 and he can confirm a judgment or 
mitigate an imposed sentence.83  The Israeli Supreme Court, however, 
has taken the position that the ability of District Chiefs to intervene 
in judicial proceedings, even in this limited fashion, undermines the 
independence of the military justice system.84  Thus, the Supreme 
Court has “tended to give a narrow interpretation to the scope and 
substance of the powers vested in District Chiefs.”85 
For instance, in what was termed the “Duvedan” case, four 
commanders charged with the negligent death of a civilian at a 
checkpoint filed an application first with the MAG and then with the 
District Chief to quash the charges against them.86  The MAG dis-
missed the application.  The District Chief stated that had the MAG 
not already dismissed the application, he would have ordered the 
charges quashed, but because the District Chief’s power to quash 
charges requires the consent of the MAG, he lacked the authority to 
do so when the MAG had already dismissed the application.87  In re-
sponse to this problem of parallel powers, the Supreme Court limited 
the power of District Chief saying, “we ought not to presume that a 
military commander may make a decision that contradicts that of the 
Military Advocate General.”88 
In Chief Military Prosecutor v. Aflaloi,89 which focused on the 
District Chief’s power to order a Chief Military Prosecutor to file an 
appeal, the Supreme Court further limited the District Chief’s discre-
tion.  It noted that because District Chiefs are not always legally 
trained or familiar with legal issues and judicial proceedings, the 
power to make decisions of a legal and judicial nature should be di-
rected away from them and decisive weight should be given to the 
opinion of the Chief Military Prosecutor.  The Court found that a 
District Chief’s choice not to follow the opinion of the Chief Military 
 
 81. Military Justice Law § 424. 
 82. Id. § 308. 
 83. Id. §§ 441-42. 
 84. See Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 146. 
 85. Id. 
 86. HCJ 2702/97, Anon. v. Minister of Defense, 53(4) P.D. 97, cited in Finkelstein & 
Tomer, supra note 72, at 146 & n.40. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Cr.A. 44/97, Chief Military Prosecutor v. Aflalo, cited in Finkelstein & Tomer, supra 
note 72, at 147 n.40. 
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Prosecutor might constitute grounds for finding an extreme lack of 
reasonableness, thereby voiding the District Chief’s decision.90 
Military judges in Israel also enjoy independence from com-
manding officers much in the same way that the MAG does.  Under 
the Israeli military justice system, judicial panels are comprised of 
three judges—one of whom is always a legally qualified judge, while 
the other two can be military judges without formal legal training.91  
Although the military judges are sometimes perceived to be less in-
dependent because they are part of the military system and thus con-
sidered subject to institutional bias, the presence of legally qualified 
judges helps to negate this perception.92  Furthermore, judges must 
answer only to the dictates of the law when rendering decisions—not 
their commanders.93 
Finally, the Israel Defense Forces have eschewed the U.S. model 
for selecting panel members and have adopted the model used by 
Canada—the random selection process.94  This process ensures that 
the panels are guaranteed to be independent.95 There have been no 
credible allegations of unlawful command influence regarding panel 
selection as the system simply does not allow for that as a possibility.96  
Thus, between the random selection of panel members, the statutory 
independence of judges and MAGs, and the great limitations placed 
on the already minimal disciplinary powers of the District Chiefs, the 
issue of unlawful command influence is moot in the Israeli military 
justice system. 
IV.  CHANGES TO THE U.S. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
There are many who are skeptical of the need to reduce the role 
of the commander in the U.S. military justice system, despite the suc-
cess of such reforms in foreign jurisdictions.  Likewise, there are 
many who think the methods used in Canada and Israel, including 
random selection of panel members or increased judicial independ-
ence, would not be transferable to the American system.  Moreover, 
some critics are opposed to making changes based on adjustments 
made in other countries.  They believe that the “just because they did 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Military Justice Law § 202. 
 92. Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 153. 
 93. Military Justice Law § 184. 
 94. Guiora Interview, supra note 79. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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it” attitude is not a good argument for why the United States should 
change.  These critics point out that the contextual and structural 
frameworks of Canada and Israel are not germane or applicable to 
the United States.97 
A. Random Selection of Panel Members 
The random selection of military panel members has been vi-
ciously attacked as unnecessary in the United States because some 
believe that the current system does not lead to biased panel mem-
bers.  Currently, the convening authority chooses panel members 
based on who is “best qualified” by considering a candidate’s “age, 
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial tem-
perament.”  98  To mitigate any potential unlawful command influence, 
which has been placed upon the panel up to this point, both the gov-
ernment and defense counsel have one preemptory challenge.99  A 
judge also has the power to grant additional preemptory challenges100 
and may, himself, remove a panel member.101  Furthermore, during 
discovery the defense receives documentation of the convening au-
thority’s nomination and selection process of panel members.102  The 
defense counsel may also interview those involved in the selection 
process, including the convening authority himself and his Staff Judge 
Advocate.103  Then, if the defense believes that unlawful command in-
fluence has taken place, she can raise a motion at trial.104  The defense 
counsel may also question panel members specifically about unlawful 
command influence during trial and request removal if she finds a 
lack of impartiality or fairness.105  Moreover, the judge has an inde-
pendent duty to question panel members on whether they were sub-
 
 97. See Behan, supra note 46, at 263; see also Theodore Essex & Leslea Tate Pickle, A Re-
ply to the Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (May 2001): “The Cox Commission,”  52 A.F. L. REV. 233, 236 (2002) (“[T]he legal issues 
decided [in Canada] were quite different than any that could be raised with regard to the 
UCMJ.”). 
 98. UCMJ art. 25(d)(2); MCM., supra note 8, R.C.M. 502(a)(1). 
 99. UCMJ, art. 41; MCM., supra note 8, R.C.M. 912(g).  
 100. United States v. Carter, 25 M.J. 471, 476 (C.M.A. 1988). 
 101. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 912(f). 
 102. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 701(a)(1). 
 103. Essex, supra note 97, at 244. 
 104. Id. 
 105. UCMJ art. 41 (2005). 
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ject to command influence.106  If a judge denies removal for cause, 
that ruling is subject to appeal.107  Finally, opportunities for unlawful 
command influence over a panel are further limited by the Article 37 
requirement that performance evaluations may not take into account 
how soldiers performed their duties as court-martial panel mem-
bers.108  “Thus the system is designed to ensure court members exer-
cise their independent judgment in evaluating the evidence in the 
case.”109 
Since the U.S. military justice system has many safeguards to 
protect the impartiality of panel members, critics of change argue that 
there is no reason to adjust the system.  Moreover, they observe that 
the random selection method used in both the Canadian and Israeli 
militaries has its own set of problems.  Most importantly, as evi-
denced by the Canadian and Israeli systems, the implementation me-
chanics and cost increase exponentially by taking the selection power 
away from the commander.110  For example, initial problems with the 
random selection model in Canada included a computer assigning a 
military attaché in Malaysia to be the president of a court-martial pro-
ceeding being held in Eastern Canada.111  Due to the sheer size of the 
American military system, this problem has the potential to be much 
more serious if the random selection method were adopted in the 
United States.112 
Another problem with the adoption of random selection in the 
United States is that a majority of service members are of junior 
enlisted rank—meaning they have little military experience.113  Thus, 
a panel chosen under a random selection method would statistically 
comprise a majority of junior members.114  Such a move would have 
significant deleterious effects: 
 
 106. Rives, supra note 21, at 226.  For instance, judges question and instruct panel membe rs 
by stating: “‘You are basically familiar with the military justice system, and you know that the 
accused has been charged, her charges have been forwarded to the convening authority and re-
ferred to trail.  None of this warrants any inference of guilt.  Can each of you follow this instruc-
tion and not infer that the accused is guilty of anything merely because the charges have been 
referred to trail?” U.S.DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES’ 
BENCHBOOK, ¶ 2-5-1 (1 Apr. 2001). 
 107. Rives, supra note 21, at 227. 
 108. UCMJ art. 37 (2005). 
 109. Rives, supra note 21, at 226. 
 110. Watkin Interview, supra note 51; Guiora Interview, supra note 79. 
 111. Behan, supra note 46, at 268. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 255. 
 114. Id. 
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[A] number of venerable and practical military justice customs 
[would be discarded]: the tradition that one’s actions will never be 
judged by someone junior in rank or experience, the philosophy 
that those who judge will be sufficiently acquainted with the princi-
ples of good order and discipline to place alleged offenses in their 
proper context, and the statutory mandate to assure that those who 
serve on courts-martial are best qualified for the duty.115 
Moreover, random selection could undermine the unique goals of the 
military and its justice system.  Random selection reduces efficiency 
by increasing administrative burdens and producing delays, and it is 
not uniformly operable within all units or under all conditions, such as 
during war or contingency operations.116  The withdrawal of selection 
power away from the commander infringes on his command ability 
because he is no longer able to direct the engagement of his person-
nel.117  It also frustrates the military justice system by taking away the 
commander’s ability to choose a specialized panel based on the needs 
of a case.118  Furthermore, it may even lower the collective compe-
tency of a panel.119  Additionally, a random selection method would 
not live up to its promise to reduce the appearance of unlawful com-
mand influence because panel members are still subject to orders, as-
signments, evaluations, and approval of commanders.120 
Use of the random selection method was tried in the U.S. mili-
tary in the 1970s at Fort Riley, Kansas.121  The method used was not a 
pure application of random selection; it disqualified the two lowest 
enlisted ranks, used optional questionnaires to create a list of quali-
fied panel members, and after the random selection of the panel 
members, the list still passed by the convening authority to receive his 
final approval.122  In United States v. Yager, Ft. Riley’s use of a modi-
fied random selection process was challenged.  123  The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals upheld the method with the proviso that the convening 
authority must make the final decision that the panel was acceptable 
based on Article 25(d)(2) criteria.124  Even approval by the Court of 
 
 115. Id. at 255-56. 
 116. Id. at 257, 261. 
 117. Behan, supra note 46, at 257. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 261. 
 120. Id. at 257. 
 121. Id. at 258. 
 122. Id. 
 123. United States v. Yager, 7 M.J. 171 (C.M.A. 1979).  
 124. Id. at 172-73. 
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Military Appeals, however, was not enough to begin a movement to-
ward the random selection method.125  Many in the military felt that 
the large administrative burden on the Staff Judge Advocate and the 
installation personnel offices, which were charged with screening the 
questionnaires, was too great.126  In addition, some felt that the panels 
failed to meet the “best qualified” criteria.127  The random selection 
model used in Yager has since been considered “an anomaly of panel 
selection jurisprudence.”128 
Finally, Congress has addressed the merits of random selection 
versus those of allowing commanders to appoint court-martial mem-
bers based on subjective criteria.  The issue was debated in the late 
‘40s and early ‘50s when Congress passed the UCMJ and has since 
been revisited, most recently in 1999 in a study by the Joint Services 
Committee on Military Justice.129  Congress chose not to include a 
random selection method when passing the UCMJ, and the Joint Ser-
vices Committee report recommended that the current system of dis-
cretionary command appointment satisfied the needs of the military 
and, therefore, should be maintained.130 
B. Independence of Military Judges 
Critics of changing the U.S. military justice system also argue 
against increasing the independence of military judges.131  One of the 
most cogent arguments in their favor is supplied by United States v. 
Graf, in which the United States Court of Military Appeals analyzed 
the positions taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Généreux 
case and found them inapplicable in the U.S. system.132  Additional 
support for their point of view stems from the requirement that mili-
tary judges report through a legal chain of command separate from 
 
 125. Behan, supra note 46, at 259. 
 126. See, e.g., id. at 259-61. 
 127. Id. at 259-61 & n.397.  The optional questionnaires created a self-selecting opt out priv i-
lege by those who chose not to fill them out and return them.  Thus, many unbiased and quali-
fied services members who felt that they were too busy with their other important military du-
ties simply chose not to return the questionnaire and thus were not eligible to serve as a panel 
member.  Id. at 260. 
 128. Id. at 259. 
 129. Id. at 195. 
 130. Behan, supra note 46, at 195-96. 
 131. See, e.g., Essex, supra  note 97. 
 132. United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450, 465-67 (C.M.A. 1992).  See discussion infra  notes 
132-145 and accompanying text. 
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that of the convening authority;133 moreover, military judges are ap-
pointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Judge Advocate General 
(JAG), 134 a disinterested party.  As one last safeguard against undue 
command influence, the convening authority does not assign individ-
ual judges to specific cases or write the judge’s annual performance 
report.135 
Despite these safeguards, Graf set forth a challenge to military 
judicial independence.  In Graf, a naval airman was tried by a general 
court-martial for numerous offenses.136  The airman alleged that the 
lack of fixed terms for military judges violated the judiciary inde-
pendence required under the Fifth Amendment.137  In developing its 
conclusion, the court looked at the Canadian military system and ana-
lyzed the U.S. military justice system under the framework estab-
lished in Généreux  because of the analogous questions raised in both 
cases.138  The court decided, however, that consideration of the prin-
ciples flowing from the Généreux case—removal only for cause, no 
convening authority influence over judges’ fitness reports, and the in-
stitutional independence of the court139—did not lead to the same 
conclusions within the U.S. system.  The court stated that the United 
States’ “general courts-martial as presently constituted can be objec-
tively perceived as being independent and impartial, . . .”140 and that 
“[i]n reality, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides substan-
tial independence and protection for military judges, both trial and 
appellate, despite their subordinate position in the military hierar-
chy.”141  Specifically addressing the Canadian court’s concern that 
judges only be removable for cause, the court noted that judges are 
sufficiently protected by rulings in past cases, which prohibit a judge 
from being removed based on his judicial actions.142  Regarding ma-
 
 133. See UCMJ art. 26 (2005) (stating that military judges are directly responsible to the 
Judge Advocate General (JAG) or his designee).  
 134. UCMJ art 6(a) (2005).  The U.S. Army, however, has instituted fixed terms for military 
judges.  Eugene R. Fidell, A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice, 48 A.F. L. 
REV. 195, 203 (2000).  
 135. See id. (stating that judges for courts-martial are designated by the JAG, and that the 
convening authority does not write the judges’ annual performance reports). 
 136. Graf, 35 M.J. at 451. 
 137. Id. at 452. 
 138. Id. at 465-67. 
 139. Regina v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 301-05. 
 140. Graf, 35 M.J. at 466. 
 141. Id. at 463. 
 142. Id. at 466. 
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nipulation of a judge’s fitness report by a commander, the court 
stated that prior rulings in this area have held that neither the JAG 
nor another commander can influence the fitness reports based on 
their dissatisfaction with the judge’s legal opinion or sentencing.143  
Similarly, the court also found that case law protects the institutional 
independence of the U.S. military judicial system through holdings 
which “protect the military appellate judiciary from untoward inter-
ference by the Department of Defense, its Inspector General and the 
Judge Advocate General.”144  Overall, the Graf court found the U.S. 
military justice system did not suffer from the same shortcomings that 
plagued the Canadian system prior to the ruling in the Généreux  case 
and, thus, held that fixed terms were not mandatory in the U.S. mili-
tary context since they are only one part of determining judicial inde-
pendence.145 
C. Perceptions and Perceived Bias 
Finally, critics of change note that a foreign jurisdiction’s belief 
that a perception of unlawful command influence damages its system 
of military discipline has no bearing on whether the U.S. system actu-
ally suffers from any problem of unlawful command influence.146  
Thus, “the better course of action would be to determine whether the 
perceptions were accurate, and if not, suggest ways to correct 
them.”147  Critics point out that there will always be those who hold a 
grudge against the military justice system—no matter how fair the 
system actually is in practice.148  Changing the system in order to ap-
pease those people would only place the military at the mercy of 
these fickle individuals.  “A justice system that responds to this sort of 
political pressure will not be seen to do justice.  Justice is better 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  “We note that a military judge at a court-martial of the United States cannot be 
overruled in his judicial decisions by the president of the court-martial, the convening authority, 
or his staff judge 
advocate.”  Id. at 466 n.10. 
 145. See Graf, 35 M.J. at 466-67 (“In sum, our military justice system and its military judges 
are not constituted the same as those considered in the Généreux  case.”).  See also Weiss v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176-81 (1994) (supporting the legitimacy and independence of mili-
tary judges in the U.S. military justice system and reiterating the holding from Graf that the lack 
of fixed terms of office for military judges does not violate the Due Process Clause).  
 146. Essex, supra note 97, at 242. 
 147. Id. at 242. 
 148. Id. at 241. 
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served in the long run, when incorrect perceptions are cha llenged and 
correct information is disseminated.”149 
In response to critics who believe that America should take a 
more isolationist perspective and disregard alterations made in other 
nations, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor offers 
three reasons why the U.S. should consider foreign law: (1) the need 
to apply foreign law in domestic courts, (2) the ability to borrow 
beneficial ideas, and (3) the enhancement of cross-border coopera-
tion.150  Justice O’Connor’s second and third points are particularly 
valid in the context of this Note.  The examination of the practices 
and failures of other nations’ military justice systems can lead the 
U.S. to the realization that the way its military does things is not the 
only way, or even the best way, to accomplish the goals of fairness 
and independence in disciplinary proceedings. 
Analyzing other military justice systems forces one to engage in a 
critical reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. system.  
America has a precedent for looking to persuasive reasoning outside 
of its own borders, and it should not disregard this precedent now, es-
pecially when reviewing innovations from other constitutional de-
mocracies that struggle with similar problems of due process, equal 
protection, and the rule of law.151  Former Justice O’Connor con-
cludes: “Our flexibility, our ability to borrow ideas from other legal 
systems, is what will enable us to remain a progressive legal system, a 
system that is able to cope with a rapidly shrinking world.”152  In light 
of joint military efforts in Iraq and the trend toward joint and United 
Nations sponsored humanitarian and peacekeeping missions around 
the world, global cooperation reinforces the need to take a broader, 
international approach in evaluating the military justice system of the 
United States.153 
Not only do international perspectives furnish ways of improving 
the U.S. military justice system, they also affect how that system is 
perceived.  Although critics would argue that emphasis should be 
placed on the reality of the system and not on perceived bias, “[g]iven 
 
 149. Id. at 242. 
 150. Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers 
Must Learn About Foreign Law, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2-3. 
 151. See id. at 2 (noting that “it was commonplace for American courts to follow develop-
ments in English courts.  Even today, first-year students of contract law cut their teeth on Eng-
lish cases like Ha dley v. Baxendale.”). 
 152. Id. at 3. 
 153. See Fidell, supra note 134, at 202. 
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the extraordinarily delicate situations the military faces around the 
world, anything that fosters foreign confidence in the integrity and in-
tellectual rigor of our system eases the task of preserving the primacy 
of the United States military jurisdiction over deployed personnel.”154  
Perceived bias is a credible concern because public perception, 
whether foreign or internal, can force change.  For example, the pub-
lic outcry that arose after the egregious acts by the Canadian military 
in Somalia and Bosnia led to an intense focus on the Canadian mili-
tary justice systems that ultimately resulted in changes. 
A similar situation could very easily happen in the United States.  
In light of the war in Iraq, operations in Afghanistan, the large num-
bers of troops being called up for active duty and sent abroad, and the 
resultant increased awareness of military issues, any perception that a 
proceeding within the military justice system is not independent and 
unbiased could lead to an intense public opinion reaction and political 
pressure for change.  “The appearance argument is a significant one, 
because you . . . want to have the confidence of people inside and out-
side of the military.”155  As noted in the Cox Commission Report, per-
ceptions and potential perceptions of injustices are a “threat to mo-
rale and a public relations disaster.”156 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The perception argument, therefore, is a noteworthy justification 
for limiting the role of the U.S. military commander in the military 
justice context.  However, “[t]here is a fundamental anomaly that 
vests a commander with life-or-death authority over his troops in 
combat but does not trust that same commander to make a sound de-
cision with respect to justice and fairness to the individual.”157  Com-
manders are in a unique position: they are responsible for military 
operations which necessarily require adherence to discipline.  To 
 
 154. Id. at 202. 
 155. Major Walter M. Hudson, Two Senior Judges Look Back and Look Ahead: An Inter-
view with Senior Judge Robinson O. Everett and Senior Judge Walter T. Cox, III, 165 MIL. L. 
REV. 42, 86 (2000). 
 156. See Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 3 (referring to a “near-constant parade 
of high-profile criminal investigations and courts-martial” and noting that “[a]s a result of the 
perceived inability of military law to deal fairly with the alleged crimes of servicemembers, a 
cottage industry of grassroots organizations devoted to dismantling the current court-martial 
system has appeared, aided by the reach of the worldwide web and driven by the passions of 
frustrated servicemembers, their families, and their counsel.”). 
 157. Behan, supra note 46, at 305 (quoting Generals William Westmoreland and George 
Prugh). 
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make a commander responsible for maintaining discipline among his 
or her troops without giving the commander power and authority 
over the military justice system, places the commander at an extreme 
disadvantage.  Furthermore, an attempt to substantially limit the role 
of the commander in the military justice system is at odds with the ul-
timate objective of maintaining the system’s efficiency and effective-
ness. Commanders are in the best position to know the needs of a 
mission, how impacts on a mission can be minimized, and whether a 
particular individual can be spared to serve as a panel member.158  
Similarly, commanders are privy to private information concerning 
the suitability of individual service members to sit on a panel.159  
Hence, commanders not only need to play a role in the military jus-
tice system, but the military justice system needs the commanders. 
It does not logically follow, however, that the need for com-
manders to play a role requires the commander to play a dominant 
role.  For the reasons stated above—mission flexibility, discipline re-
sponsibility, and knowledge of privileged information – the com-
mander should retain some authority in the military justice system.  
The current balance struck with regard to command influence and the 
independence of judges, as illustrated by the Graf court, seems to be 
particularly appropriate.  However, as demonstrated by the systems 
in Canada and Israel, reducing the commander’s power to appoint 
panel members to courts-martial would not unduly limit the strength 
of his control over discipline nor excessively burden the utility of the 
military justice system.  It would, on the other hand, greatly decrease 
the appearance and perception of unlawful command influence. 
Although there are many safeguards against a commander’s 
unlawful influence on a panel, in some instances, the safeguards are 
not very effective.  For instance, judicial removal of a panel member 
is very difficult to accomplish because the standard set for removal—
that the member “expressed a definite opinion”  160 as to the guilt of 
the defendant—is very high.  Thus, in some respects, the safeguards 
still leave the door open for unlawful command influence.  The insti-
tution of a random selection method would close the door on the 
question of panel independence and bias. 
 
 158. Essex, supra note 97, at 249. 
 159. Id. 
 160. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 912(f). 
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A modification of the random selection method is recommended 
in the Cox Commission Report.161  As stated above, under this form 
the convening authority would create a list from which panel mem-
bers would be randomly chosen.162  Consequently, the convening au-
thority would still select who could serve as panel members; it would 
be within his or her discretion to list only the toughest and most par-
tial officers and enlisted service members, or perhaps those deemed 
most easily influenced.163 
Hence, this method would do very little to decrease bias, per-
ceived or otherwise.  To avoid the possibility of continued opportu-
nity for undue command influence, a different version of the random 
selection method should be used instead.  First, panel members 
should be screened using Article 25(d)(2) criteria by a body inde-
pendent of the convening authority.  Next, those who are below the 
rank of the accused should be presumptively disqualified.  Finally, a 
random selection of the remaining qualified candidates should be 
conducted, while ensuring that a cross-section of ranks be repre-
sented.164  The convening authority should then be given the power to 
review the randomly selected panel members to prevent any potential 
mission conflicts, but his decision to remove a member from the panel 
should be reviewed with great scrutiny.  This system would ensure in-
dependence, while preserving the custom that an accused is not 
judged by a person of a lower rank, guaranteeing that missions are 
not compromised, and minimizing any public perception of bias.165 
Even if the role of the U.S. commander in the military justice sys-
tem was exceedingly limited, like that of the Israeli commander, he 
would still maintain a sizeable toehold in the military justice system 
through the use of administrative corrective measures166 and nonjudi-
cial punishment.167  Most disciplinary problems fall into these catego-
 
 161. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 7. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Essex, supra note 97, at 248. 
 164. In the Canadian Forces, chaplains, legal officers, security officers, witnesses, and offi-
cers from the accused’s unit are presumptively disqualified.  Behan, supra note 46, at 267-68. 
 165. A greater administrative burden would naturally ensue, but could be somewhat miti-
gated by the use of computers.  Furthermore, the increased administrative burdens and cost is a 
trade -off necessary to attain greater protection of soldiers’ rights and a decrease in actual and 
perceived unlawful command influence. 
 166. MCM, supra note 8, Part V, ¶ 1(g). 
 167. UCMJ art. 15 (2005); MCM, supra  note 8, Part V, ¶ 4. 
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ries and, thus, fall outside of the court-martial system.168  Leaving the 
majority of disciplinary matters within the power of commanders rec-
ognizes the authority and leadership of the commander and his ulti-
mate responsibility for the discipline of his troops. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the U.S. commander’s role in the military justice 
system is distinctive because of his dominant position and control 
over many aspects of disciplinary proceedings.  Other nations, such as 
Canada and Israel, have restricted the role of commanders in their 
military justice systems in order to limit actual bias as well as accusa-
tions and perceptions of unlawful command influence in judicial pro-
ceedings.  Perception of bias is also a credible concern in the U.S. 
military justice system.  One method of handling this problem would 
be to focus on educating the public about the military justice system 
and the safeguards in place to protect fairness.  This route would be 
particularly satisfactory in the instance of judicial independence, as 
explained in Graf.  A change in society’s frame of reference would go 
a long way to reverse mistaken perceptions. 
Regarding the selection of panel members, the justifications for 
the commander maintaining control in this area do not outweigh the 
rights of the accused and society’s need to not only know, but to per-
ceive that the selection process is fair.  “The procedures for disciplin-
ing the military forces of a nation are a direct reflection of the society 
that the forces were created to protect.”169A random selection method 
for panel members, similar to the process in Canada and Israel, but 
modified to meet the particular needs of the United States military, 
would balance the American public’s fairness concerns with the need 
for the commander to maintain some authority and control over the 
discipline of his soldiers. 
 
 168. Shanor, supra note 20, at 103.  The same is true in Canada, where most disciplinary 
matters are handled in Summary Tribunals, the equivalent of a U.S. Article 15 administrative 
punishment.  Watkin, supra note 51. 
 169. Pitzul, supra note 48, at 1, quoting R.A. McDonald, The Trail of Discipline: The His-
torical Roots of Canadian Military Law, 1 C.F. JAG J. 1, 1 (1985).  
